ON THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE.

and should be eliminated. Fault at sea will produce almost absolutely different consequences from those on the land.
This may appear to be casuistry : the results seem so violently
wrong that these conclusions may be escaped by some course of
ratiocination which is not apparent. The fallacy is, however, in the
first step of the reasoning, which, by giving the shipper the right to
destroy the insurer's right of subrogation without his assent or knowledge (a right given by law to every surety who indemnifies his
principal), has not seen the consequences which follow in a commercial system which has been the work of years.
It is the first step which counts-the rest reasonably follows as
soon as it is determined that an insurance of goods is a right in the
res, which follows the goods into whosoever hands the title comes,
whether by assignment for a consideration or acquired by paying for a wrongful act of destruction. This, if correct, is a new
view of the contract. Barratry of the master or an act of spoliation
will create liability on the part of the shipowner, and must therefore be paid for by the insurers of the cargo; it is to be hoped that
liability occasioned by unseaworthiness will not also be visited on
the insurers of cargo.
The judicial mind has, with one exception, in this long controversy throughout the many phases it has assumed, been so singleminded as to the effect of this clause in the shipper's contract, that
there may be a vice in these views which has not been seen by the
writer. The results of the litigation by which the underwriter has been
compelled to bear losses he did not contract to pay, in the struggle by
the carriers to escape payment for losses for which they are liable,
suggests the saying in regard to the naval action of Navarino, that
"it was a very good fight, only the wrong man was knocked down."
AloRnoN P. HENRY.
Philadelphia.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

United States Circuit Court, .Easterm Distriet of Wisconsin.
CRANDAL v. ACCIDENT INS. C0. OF NORTH AMERICA.
Where one whose judgment and will are overthrown by insanity, takes his own
life by hanging himself, his act is not "suicide," within the meaning of that word as
used in accident policies of insurance, nor are his injuries considered "self-inflicted,"
or his death "1caused wholly or in part by infirmity or disease." It is considered to
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have been caused by injuries " effected through external, accidental and violent
means."
Where the last of several successive causes has produced an effect, the law will
not regard the cause of that cause. "
Where an application for insurance differs from the policv issued thereon, it is not
considered a part thereof, and admissions by the assured in his application as to the
extent of the insurance do not limit the insurer's liability.

AT LAW. Motion for a new trial in suit on an accident policy
of insurance.
House, Fry & Rdbb, for plaintiff.
Thomas Bates, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DYER, J.-On the 23d day of May 1884, the defendant company issued to Edward M. Crandal, since deceased, an accident
policy of insurance, by which it promised to pay to the plaintiff,
who was the wife of the insured, the sum of $10,000, within thirty
days after sufficient proof that the insured, at any time within the
continuance of the policy, had sustained bodily injury effected
through external, accidental and violent means, within the intent
and meaning of the contract and the conditions thereunto annexed,
and such injuries alone had occasioned death within ninety days
from the happening thereof. It was provided in the policy that
the insurance should not extend to death or disability, "which may
have been caused, wholly or in part, by bodily infirmities or disease." Further, that no claim should be made under the policy
if the death of the insured should be caused by suicide or selfinflicted injuries.
While this policy was in force, the insured, Edward Ms Crandal, took his own life by hanging, and the jury, to whom the case
was submitted for a special verdict on the facts, has found that at
the time of the act of self-destruction he was insane. The question
reserved for consideration by the court, and now to be determined,
is, whether the death was one covered by the policy. The question
of liability, as it here arises upon an accident policy of insurance,
seems to be one of first impression. Unaided by direct authority,
the court is called on to determine: First. Whether under such a
policy as this, death from self-destruction, occur'ring when the insured
is insane, may be said to .have been caused by bodily injuries
effected through accidental means. This question, it will be understood, is here to be considered independently of the question
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whether disease or physical infirmity was a promoting cause of
death.
The verdict of the jury was unquestionably right. The case
was one in which the evidence clearly established the fact of insanity. The symptoms of a disordered mind were manifested in the
countenance, conduct and conversation of the insured. He was
sleepless, was sometimes unduly excited, then unnaturally depressed.
He suffered to such an extent from melancholy that he abandoned
his accustomed habits and pursuits. Fondness for family and
friends changed to indifference, and, in short, his reasoning powers
and self-control appear to have been prostrated by the fear of want,
and by morbid impulses and delusions, such as in this species of
insanity impel to self-destruction. Upon the facts shown, the jury
might well find that his judgment, his volition, his will, were overthrown, so that in the language of Mr. Justice NELSON, when Chief
Justice of New York, in the case of Breasted v. Farmers'L.
T. Co., 4 Hill 73, 75, "The act of suicide was no more his act
in the sense of the law than if he had been impelled by irresistible
physical power." Upon the verdict and the facts which sustain it,
it may then be assumed that when the deceased took his life it was
not his voluntary rational act. He could not exercise his natural
powers of volition, and thereby control his judgment upon the act
he was -about to commit. The physical violence, therefore, which
terminated his life, was the same as if it had come upon him from
sources outside of himself, and for which he was not responsible.
It was force emanating, not from the brain and band of Edward
M. Crandal, as a responsible voluntary agent, but force which was
uncontrollable so far as he was concerned.
The means employed
to produce death were external and violent. Were they not also
in a just and true sense accidental, if the deceased was so far
bereft of his reasoning faculties that his act was not the result of
his will, or of a voluntary operation of his mind ? If, in consequence of his condition of irresponsibility, the violence which he
inflicted upon himself was the same as if it had operated upon him
from without, why was not the death an accident within the definition of the term as given by Bouvier, namely, " an event which
under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person
to whom it happens. Thze halpening of an event without the concurrence of the will of the person byi whose agenc.y it was caused" P
No case has been cited where the question, as here presented,

876

CRAMNDAL v. ACC. INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA.

was directly in judgment; but there are dicta which afford some
aid in reaching a conclusion. In 7 Amer. L. Rev. 587, 588, various
definitions of an accident, as the term is used in insurance policies,
are given, namely : "An accident is any event which takes place
without the oversight or expectation of the person acted upon or
affected by the event :" Ripley v. By. Passengers'Assurance Co.,
2 Bigelow's Cases 738; Providence Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 32
Md. 310. "It is any unexpected event which happens as by chance,
or which does not take place according to the usual course of
things :"
. Am. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs,69 Penn. St. 43. "It is
something which takes place without any intelligent or apparent
cause, without design 1 and out of course:" Mallory v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52. "Some violence, casualty or vis major is
necessarily involved" in the term accident. It means, in short, in
insurance policies, "any injury which .happens by reason of some
violence, casualty or vis major to the assured without his design or
consent or voluntary co-operation." Similar definitions are given
by Mr. Justice PAINE inhis discussion of the question, in Schneider
v. Ins. Co., 21: Wis. 80.
In Scheidererv. Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 14, it was alleged in the pleading, that while the assured, who was travelling in a railway car,
"wag in a dazed and unconscious condition of mind, and not knowing or realizing what he was doing, he involuntarily arose from his
seat and walked unconsciously to the platform of the car, and fell
therefrom to the ground ;" and it was held that this constituted a
good cause of action upon a policy of accident insurance. Here, it
is true, the injury resulted from falling from the car; but since the
moving cause was the involuntary act of leaving the seat and walking to the platform, the case suggests the inquiry, if, for example,
a person in a fit of somnambulism, or in delirium, not knowing or
realizing what he is doing, involuntarily inflicts injury upon himself-that is, by means of his own hand-and death ensues, is not
such an injury as much the result of accident, as if, in the same
circumstances, the injury results from other external forces, such as
falling from the platform of a moving train ?
In Hill v. Ins. Co., 22 Hun 189, the insured took poison by mistake, and died suddenly. The court said that death occurred
through accidefital means. The taking of poison was not the result
of the will or intention of the person, and was therefore not his voluntary act. It was adjudged, however, that the plaintiff could not
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recover, on the ground that the policy contained a clause, that the
company should not be liable if death should be caused by taking
poison. And this clause was held to exempt the company from
liability, -i hether the poison was taken intentionally or by mistake.
In Piercev. Travelers' Insurance Co., 34 Wis. 395, Mr. Chief Justice DIXON, speaking for the court, in interpreting the clause in the
policy in question in that case, referred to instances of death resulting from an act committed under the influence of delirium, as if
the person should, in a paroxysm of fever, precipitate himself from
a window, or, having been bled, remove the bandages; or, should
take poison by mistake ; and observed, that deaths thus produced
"are more properly denominated deaths by accident than deaths
by suicide. * * * Deaths so caused, are held to be deaths by
accident within the meaning and purpose of policies of insurance
against accident, as where a man negligently draws a loaded gun
towards him by the muzzle, or the servant fills the lighted lamp
with kerosene, and the gun is discharged, and the lamp explodes."
In Zorn v. Life Ins. Co., 7 Jur. (N. S.) 673, the court, in passing
upon the question, whether a policy of insurance upon life is rendered void by the suicide of the insured, when insane, speaks of such
a death as just as much an accident as if the insured had fallen
from the top of a house.
In Breasted v. Farmers'L. & T. Co., 8 N. Y. 306, it was observed by the court, that "a death by accident and a death by the
party's own hand, when deprived of reason, stand on principle in
the same category. In both cases the act is done without a controlling mind."
To maintain the proposition that because his own hand constituted
the violent means employed by the insured in taking his life, those
means were not external and accidental, it is necessary to take a distinction between force emanating from the insane person himself,
and force operating independently from without. I can hardly
think there is ground for such a distinction. The injury and the
death seem equally fortuitous in both cases, for in neither case is
there a concurring will which prompts the act, An insane man
burns his own insured property. The insurer is nevertheless liable
for the loss, unless its contract expressly exempts it from liability,
even in case of such a burning ; this, for the reason that the act
was not voluntary, or done with the assent, procurement or design
of the assured as a rational person : lfarow v. ContinentalLis. Co.,
VoL. XXXI.-4S
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57 Wis. 56.

Although, in the darkness that enveloped his mind,

the hand of Edward M. Crandal adjusted the fatal noose, the act
was no more attributable to his .voluntary agency, than if, as a sane
man walking the street in the darkness of night, the same fatality,
without co-operation on his part, or even consciousness of danger,
bad overtaken him. Therefore, it would seem that in the one case
as in the other, the death would be attributable to casualty. Additional force is given to this view of the question, when we consider
that in cases arising upon life insurance policies decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, it has been repeatedly held that
if the insured, while in the possession of his ordinary reasoning
faculties, from any motive, intentionally takes his own life, such
death is within the proviso on the subject 6f suicide, and the insurer
is not liable. On the contrary, if the insured takes his life when
insane, then the death can not be said to be "by his own hand,"
and the insurer.is liable. And so it would seem to follow, that, as
4n the latter instance, the act of self-destruction is not the act of
the party, it must be regarded in a case like the present, as brought
about by means which are accidental, because not the result of the
concurring will of the insured.
It is to be further observed that in the policy in suit the company
declares that it incurs no liability in case of death from suicide or
self-inflicted injuries. Thus it appears that the insurer took into
consideration the possibility that the insured might voluntarily, ana
with deliberate intent-that is, as a sane person-take his life,
and in such case the death was not to be regarded as covered by
the contract, because not effected by accidental means. This is the
import of this clause in the policy; but no provision is made
against suicide when insane. And this also adds force to the view
that the contract is fairly open to the construction contended for
by the plaintiff. By the term "self-inflicted injuries," as used in
the policy, was not meant injuries inflicted by the insured upon
himself when insane, but injuries self-inflicted when capable of
rational, voluntary action.
Several cases have been cited by counsel for tlhe defendant.
-Among them is Harris v. Travelers' Ins. (o., decided by the
Superior Court of Chicago in 1868, and referred to in 7 Am. Law
Rev. 589 ; but the point here involved does not seem to have been
there raised. The deceased was a fireman, who was accidentally
buried under a falling wall, but was soon rescued without apparent
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injury, and continued his work for three months, when he took
poison. In a suit to recover the insurance on the ground that the
accident rendered him insane, it -was held that if he was insane on
account of the accident, the death was too remote to be covered by
the policy, which included only proximate results. It would seem
that the plaintiff relied upon the original accident as a ground of
recovery, and that was held too remote. Another case cited is Pollock v. U. S. Maut. Accident Assoc., 28 Alb. L. J. 518. But all
that was decided in that case was, that the defendant was not liable
for a death by poison, because the contract so expressly provided ;
and in view of that provision it made no difference whether the
poison was innocently or intentionally taken. There was no question of insanity involved, and moreover the death was not caused
by "external violence," and this was one of the prerequisites to
recover as fixed in the contract. In Bayless v,Travelers' irns. Go.,
14 Blatchf. 144, the question of insanity did not arise, and it is on
the same line in principle with Pollock v. U. S. Mut. Accident
AsCoc., supra.
On the whole, my conclusion is, that the death of the insured,
Edward M. Crandal, resulted from injuries. effected through
accidental and violent means, within the meaning of the policy in
suit.
Second. Still another and equally interesting question remains to
be determined. The contention of the defendant is, that the death
in this case was caused by bodily infirmities or disease, namely, the
insanity of the insured, and therefore that the plaintiff cannot
recover. As has been observed, the policy provides that the company shall not be liable if the death be "caused wholly or in part
by bodily infirmities or disease." The policy further recites that it
is issued in consideration of the warranties made in the application
for insurance, and of the premium paid; and in the application signed
by the assured, he makes certain statements of fact usual in such
cases, the last of which, numbered fifteen, is as follows : "I am
aware that this insurance will not extend to * * * any bodily
injury happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease;
nor to death or disability caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities, or by disease; * * nor to any case except when the accidental
injury shall be the proximate and sole cause of disability or death."
This is not a warranty of any fact. It is, in effect, merely an
admission of knowledge on the part of the insured of such limita-

380

CRANDAL v. ACC. INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA.

tions of liability as may be declared in the policy. As, therefore,
it is to the policy we must look forthese limitations, it is observable
that the policy does not declare that the insurance shall not extend
to any bodily injury, "happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease ;" but only that it shall not extend "to death or
disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily
infirmities or disease." This, then, is the limitation of liability to
be considered as it is expressed in the policy issued and delivered
subsequently to the application for insurance, rather than the statements on the subject contained in the application. The fifteenth
clause in the application is not referred to in the policy. Wherein
therefore it differs from the written contract, it is no part of the
contract.
The argument of counsel for the defendant, is, in brief, that
insanity is a bodily infirmity or disease; that in ordinary life insurance cases it is regarded and characterized by the courts as a disease,
and therefore it is, that insurance companies are held liable in cases
of suicide when the insured wag insane. Further, that in the case
in hand, the act of self-destruction was occasioned by the insanity,
and so that within the meaning of the policy, the death was caused
by disease. I was much impressed with the force of this argument,
and I may use the language of DENMAN, J., in a case hereafter
referred to, "but for Winspear v. Accident Ins. Co., 6 Q. B. Div.
42, I am not sure but that I should have thought the company were
protected."
It is true that in cases upon life policies, death by an insane
suicide is regarded by the courts as death by disease. As it is
expressed in Eastabrook v. The Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me.
224, " Death by disease is provided for by the policy. Insanity is
a disease. Death which is the result of insanity, is death by disease."
It is to be borne in mind, however, that this and similar observations
are made in a class of cases where the insurance is not special but
general, and where the protection which it is intended to afford,
covers all diseases and disorders-other than those which may be
specially excepted-which result in death. In the case of a life
policy it may not matter whether the disease of insanity, or the
particular act of self-destruction be regarded as the immediate cause
It is the life which is insured, and liability arises
of death.
when death occurs, unless the death is within one of the specially
excepted cases enumerated in the policy. The fact, therefore, that
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in such cases it is said that death which is the result of insanity, is
death by disease, does not reach the-question we have here, which
is-what, under the provisions of a policy which covers accidents
only, was the cause of death ? In the sense of the clauses on the
subject in this policy, was the death caused by disease, or by the
act of violence in question ? Although the words of the policy are
" caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease." I
suppose the true inquiry is, what was the actual proximate cause
of death? For in law there is but one cause. That is the proximate cause, which may either directly or indirectly produce the
result. If the death was caused in part by disease, the disease must
have been a proximate cause of death.
"One of the most valuable criteria furnished us by the authorities," says Mr. Justice MILLER, in Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44,
"is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the
fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power
has intervened of itself sufficient to stand as a cause of the misfortune
the other must be considered as too remote." In .ins.Co. v. Trans.
Co., 12 Wall. 199, it was said by Mr. Justice STRONG, "There is
undoubtedly difficulty in many cases attending the application of
of the maxim proxima causa non remota spectatur, but none when
the causes succeed each other in order of time. In such cases the
rule is plain. When one of several successive causes is sufficient to
produce that effect, the law will not regard an antecedent cause of
that cause, or the 'causa causans.' In such a case there is no
doubt which cause is the proximate one within the meaning of the
maxim, But when there is no order of succession in time, when
there are two concurrent causes of a loss, thepredominatingefficient
one must be regarded as the proximate, when the damage done by
each cannot be distinguished."
The cases most nearly in point upon the question here in judgment, are Reynolds v. Accidental Ins. Co., 22 Law T. Rep. (N.
S.) 820 ; Winspear v.Accident Ins. Co., (Limited), L. R., 6 Q. B.
Div. 42; Lawrence v. Accidental Ins. Co., (Limited), 7 Id. 216 ;
and Solieffer v. Railroad, 105 U. S. 249. Although it may extend
this opinion to greater length than is desirable, it seems necessary
to give attention to these cases somewhat in detail.
In the Reynolds Case, the facts were that Thomas Humphrey
effected with the defendant company "a policy of insurance whereby
it was declared that if. during the continuance of such policy the
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said Thomas Humphrey should. receive or suffer bodily injury from
any accident or violence, in case such accident or violence should
cause the death of the said Thomas Humphrey within three calendar
months after the occurrence of such accident or violence, the full
sum of three hundred pounds should be payable to the personal
representatives, &c. * ** Provided also, and it is hereby expressly
agreed and declared that no claim shall be payable by the said company under the policy in respect of death or injury by accident or
violence, unless such death or injury shall be occasioned by some
external and material cause operating upon the person of the said
insured, and unless in the case of death as aforesaid, such death
shall take placefrom such accident or violence within three calendar
months, &c."
It appeared that Humphrey, while the policy was in force, went
into the sea to bathe. While in a pool about one foot deep, he
became suddenly insensible from some unexplained internal cause,
and fell into the water with his face downwards. A few miiutes
afterwards he was found lying dead with his face in the water, and
water escaped from his lungs in such a manner as to prove that he
had breathed after falling into the water. The question for the
opinion of the court was, whether the death of Humphrey occurred
in a manner entitling the plaintiff as his executor to receive the sum
of three hundred pounds under or by virtue of the policy. Bosanquet, for the defendant, argued, that "if a man is pushed into the
water, or forcibly held down in it, his death then results from
violence within the meaning of the policy. If a man accidentally
falls into the water and is drowned, his death results from accident;
but ifa man falls down in afit in a shallow pool, and is drowned,
his death is the result, not of accident, or of violence, 6ut of the fit,
even though the immediate cause of death be, as here, suffocation by
drowning." WILLES, J. said "In this case the death resulted from
the action of the water on the lungs, and from the consequent interference with respiration. 'I think that the fact of the deceased
falling in the water from sudden insensibilitywas an accident,and
consequently our judgment must be for the plaintiff." It is to
'be observed of this case, that it has only a general application to the
question under consideration, because the proviso in the policy contained no such condition as we have here in relation to disease as a
cause, in whole or in part, of death.
In the Winpspear Case, the facts were, that W. effected an insur-
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ance with the defendants against accidental injury, and by the terms
of the policy the defendants agreed to pay the amount insured to
W.'s legal representatives, should he sustain " any personal injury
caused by accidental, external and visible means," and the direct
effect of such injury should cause his death. The policy also contained a proviso that the insurance should not extend "to any injury caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness, or
exhaustion consequent upon disease, * * * or to any death
arisingfrom disease, although such death may have been accelerated
by accident." During the time the policy was in force, and whilst
W. was crossing a stream, he was seized by an epileptic fit and fell
into the stream, and was drowned whilst sufferiny from the fit, but
he did not sustain any personal injury to occasion death, other than
drowning.
Here it was argued that there would have been no drowning had
the insured not had an epileptic fit; that it was the fit which caused
the drowning, and that the death, therefore, was from an injury
caused by the fit. Just as it is argued in the case at bar, that there
would have been no suicide had the insured not been insane ; that
it was the insanity which caused suicide, and that, therefore, the
death was from an injury caused by insanity. But COLERIDGE, 0.
J., said: " I am of opinion that this judgment should be affirmed,
and that on very plain grounds. It appears to be clear from the
statement in this case, that the insured died from drowning in the
waters of the brook whilst in an epileptic fit, and drowning has been
decided to be an injury, because in the words of this policy, caused
by " accidental, external and visible means." I am, therefore, of
opinion, that the injury from which he died was a risk covered by
this policy, and the only question then remaining is, whether the
case is within the proviso which provides that the insurance "shall
not extend to death by suicide, whether felonious or otherwise, or
to any injury caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness, or exhaustion consequent upon disease." It is certainly not
within the first part of this proviso, because the death was not so
occasioned. Neither does it appear to me, that the cause of death
was within those latter words of the proviso. The death was not
caused by any natural disease or weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease, but by the accident of drowning. I am of
opinion, that those words in the proviso mean what they say, and
that they point to an injury caused by natural disease, as if, for in-
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stance, in the present case, epilepsy had really been the cause of
the death. The death, however, did not arise from any such cause,
and those words have no application to the case, and therefore the
judgment of the Exchequer Division-must be affirmed." This case,
in its facts and upon principle, appears to be directly in point; for
if there the death was not in a legal sense caused by the fit, but by
the drowning, so here it was not caused by the insanity or disease,
but by the act of self-destruction.
In the case of Lawrence, there was a policy of insurance against
death from accidental injury, which contained the following condition : "This policy insures payment only in case of injuries accidentally occurring from material and e ternal cause, operating
upon the person of the insured, where such accidental injury is the
direct and sole cause of death to the insured. * * * But it
does not insure in the case of death arising from fits; * * * or
any disease whatever arising before or at the time or following
such accidental injury (whether consequent upon such accidental
injury or not, and whether causing such death directly or jointly
with such accidental injury)." The insured, while at a railway station, was seized by a fit, and fell off the platform across the railway, and an engine and carriage passed over his body and killed
him. The falling forward of the insured off the platform was in
consequence of his being seized with a fit -or sudden illness, and
but for such fit or illness he would not have suffered injury or
death.
DENMAN, J., following the authority of Winspear v. Accident
Ins Co., held the company liable.
WILLIAMS, J., placed his concurring opinion upon the following
grounds: "The whole case depends upon the true construction of
the words in the proviso in this case. The deceased person having
fallen down suddenly in a fit from the platform of the railway on
to the rails, was, while lying there, accidentally run over by a train
that happened at that moment unfortunately to come up; and he
was undoubtedly killed by the direct external violence Qf the engine
upon his body, which caused his death immediately. The question
arises whether, according to the true construction of the proviso, it
can be said that this is a case of death arising from fits ; because
if this death did not arise from a fit, according to the true construction of the policy, the remainder of the clause does not come
into existence at all, and is inapplicable. It seems to me that the
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well-known maxim of Lord BACON, which is applicable to all
departments of law, is directly applicable in this case. Lord
BACON'S language in his Maxims of the Law, Reg. 1, runs thus:
'It were infinite for the law to consider the causes of causes, and
Therefore, it contenteth itself
their impulsions one of another.
with the immediate cause.' Therefore I say, according to the true
principle of law, I must look at only the immediate and proximate
cause of death ; and it has seemed to me to be impracticable to go
back to cause upon cause, which would bring us back ultimately to
the birth of the person, for had he not been born, the accident would
not have happened. The true meaning of this proviso is, that if
the death arose from a fit, then the company are not liable, even
though accidental injury contributed to the death, in the sense that
they were both causes which operated jointly in causing it. That
is the meaning, in my opinion, of this proviso. But it is essential
to that construction that it should be made out that the fit was a
cause, in the sense of being the proximate and immediate cause of
the death, before the company are exonerated ; and it is not the less
so because you can show that another cause intervened and assisted
in the causation."
Thus it appears, that although the proviso in the policy in that
case was that if the death should arise from a fit, the company should
not be liable, even though accidental injury contributed to the death
by operating jointly with the fit, it was, nevertheless, held essential
to show that the fit was a cause in the sense of being the immediate
cause of death, in order to exonerate the company.
Scheffer v. Railroad,supra, only has application here by way
of analogy. In that case a passenger on a railway car was injured
by a collision of trains, and became thereby disordered in mind and
body, and some eight months thereafter committed suicide. It was
held in a suit by his personal representatives against the railway
company, that his own act was the proximate cause of his death,
and that therefore there could be no recovery.
Although it may be said that Crandal would not have committed
suicide had he not been insane, and so that the insanity was a promoting cause of death, upon the reasoning and authority of the cases
referred to, the conclusion seems unavoidable that the act of selfdestruction must be regarded, within the meaning of the policy, as
the true and proximate cause of his death. Quite against my first
impressions when the case was submitted, I am constrained to hold
VOL. XXXIV.-49
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upon deliberate consideration, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
If I am wrong in my conclusions, it is a gratification to know that
the case is one that may be takien to the Supreme Court for its judgment, and in which the error, if error has been committed, may be
there corrected.
Judgnnent for plaintiff on the verdict.
It is seldom that either a life or accident policy of insurance is issued which
does not contain a provision intended
to protect the insurer against liability
in some or all cases of self-destruction
by the assured. In most of the cases in
which such provisions have come before
the courts, as in the principal case, the
question has been as to their application
in cases of self-destruction while insane.
It has never, perhaps, been doubted by
any court, that self-destruction resulting
directly from insanity is as much insured
against by an ordinary policy of insurance containing no provision on the subject as death resulting from any other
disease ; and, it is equally well settled
that a provision that the company shall
not be liable on the policy in case of selfdestruction by assured while insane
(Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93
U. S. 284; Gorgoza v. Ins. Co., 65 N.
Y. 232; Chapman v. Ins. Co., 6 Biss.
238; Knights of the Golden Rule v.Ainsworth, 17 Rep. 139 ; or, shall in that
event only be liable for a certain sum,
less than the amount of the insurance:
Salentine v. Ins. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 159 ;
Frey v. Ins. Co., 52 N. W. Rep. 100)
is valid. The difficulty in cases involving the application of provisions concerning self-destruction is in ascertaining
the exact meaning of the language used.
This difficulty has arisen partially from
the fact that words and expressions are
frequently employed which have more
than one meaning, and partially from
there being many degrees and kinds of
insanity. As for instance, the word
"suicide," as used in criminal law, means
criminal self-murder ; but in ordinary
conversation it is used to cover all

cases of voluntary self-destruction, whether committedwhilesane or insane. And
so also, as to insanity; a man may be so
completely insane as to be unable to comprehend the probable result of acts calculated to destroy life, or understand the
character of the act of suicide ; or, he
may be driven to self-destruction by an
insane impulse, temporary or otherwise,
over which he has no control, and which
he is unable to resist, though able, perhaps, to understand both the physical and
moral character of his act; or, he may
be morally insane so as to be unable to
comprehend the moral character of suicide
and be otherwise sane, and able to
understand its physical character and
probable consequences to others, and
retain a certain amount of self-control. In any of these or of the many
other cases of mental aberration which
might be mentioned, the man is in
common parlance said to be insane.
In construing provisions exempting
insurers from liability in cases of selfdestruction, the courts, and especially
the American courts, hold that inasmuch
as they are prepared by the insurer and
provide for a forfeiture, they should
always be construed most strongly against
the company: National Bankv. Ins. Co.,
95 U. -S. 673; Schultz v. Ins. Co., 40
Ohio St. 217 ; Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86
Penn. St. 92.
PARTICULAR
OF
CONSTRUCTION
PHRASES.-" Die by his own hand;"

"Die by his "ownhand or act;" Shall
under any circumstances die by his own
hand;" "Die by suicide" "and " Commit suicide," are synonymous phrases:
Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580 ; Schultz
v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 217 ; Breasted
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v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 4 Hill
74 ;. Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush 268;
McEntire v. Ins. Co., 102 Mfass. 230;
Phadenhauer v. Ins. Co., 7 Heisk; 567.
Cases bearing directly upon one of them
are cited by the courts as equally conclusive as to the others. They will, therefore, he considered together.
Accidental death.-In the first place,
it may be noted that such phrases
do not cover cases of accidental selfdestruction. An intention to kill must
be coupled with the fatal act: Ins. Co. v.
Paterson, 41 Ga. 338. This has been
held to be so, where the expressions used
were much broader than the above, as
for instance: "die by suicide, whether
voluntary or lnvoluntary:" Edwards v.
Ins. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 661 ; and "die
by his own hand or act voluntary or otherwise:" Penfold v. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y.
317. And where a policy provided that
it should be void in case of "self-destruction of the person, whether voluntary or involuntary, and whether sane or insane,"
the language used was held not to include
death resulting from a negligent act,
unless the negligence was "culpable":
Ins. Co. v. Laurence, 8 Brad. (Ill.)
488.
Insane Self-destruction.-What has
been said as to the necessity of an
intention on the part of the assured to
kill himself, in order to bring the act
within the meaning of the expressions
first above quoted, is perfectly applicable
in cases of insane self-destruction. Where
the intention to destroy his own life is
lacking, self-destruction by a lunatic is,
to all intents and purposes, a mere accident, as was held in the principal case:
Mallory v. Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52.
In Breasted v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., 4 Hill 73 (1843), the suit was
upon a policy of insurance on the life of
one Comfort. The policy contained a
clause providing that, in case the assured
should die upon the seas, &c., or by his
own hand, or, in consequence of a duel,
or by the hands of justice, &c., the policy

should be void. The defendant pleaded
that Comfort committed suicide by drowning himself. The replication was that
be had drowned himself while he was of
"unsound mind and wholly unconscious of
the act." To this the plaintiff demurred.
The Supreme Court of New York
held that the plaintiff was entitled
to judgment. In delivering the opinion of the court NELsoN, C. J., said:
" Speaking legally also (and the
policy should be subjected to the test),
self-destruction by a fellow-being bereft
of reason can with no more propriety be
ascribed to the act of his own hand than
to the deadly instrument that may have
been used for the purpose. The drowning of Comfort was no more his act in
the sense of the law, than if he had
been impelled by irresistible physical
power ; nor is there any greater reason
for exempting the company from the
risk assumed in the policy than if his
death had been occasioned by such
means."
This is the earliest American case in
point, and the language there used by
the learned chief justice has recently
been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States: Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109
U. S. 121, 131 (1883), and is believed
by the writer to be a correct exposition
of the law as it now stands, both in this
country and England.
Wherever a
man is driven to the act of selfdestruction by an insane impulse which
he is powerless to resist, or where be
takes his own life while unconscious of
the physical nature of the act, his will
is considered silent, and his act outside
of the meaning of the word "suicide"
and the synonymous expressions : Banks
v. Ins. Co., 5 Big. Life & Ace. Ins. Rep.
481 ; Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232;
Newton v. Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 426;
Hathaway v. Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335;
Eastbrook v. Ins. Co., 41 Me. 224;
lVt'ters v. Ins. Co., 2 Fed. Rep.
892 ; Weed v. Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. (Sup.
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Ct.) 476; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v.
Peters, 42 Md. 414; Ins. Co. v. Moore,
34 -Mich. 41.
Contra, Cooper v. Life
Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227.
Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Manning &
Gr. 639 (1843), is the leading English
case upon this subject. The question
there was as to the effect of moral insanity upon the insurer's liability. The
policy sued on provided that in case the
assured "shall die upon the seas, or
go beyond the limits of Europe, or enter
into or engage in any naval or military
service whatsoever, unless license be
obtained from a zourt of directors of the
said society, or shall die by his own hands,
or by the hands of justice, or in cosequence of a duel," it should be void.
The jury returned averdict "that Mr.
Borradaile voluntarily threw himself
from the bridge with the intention of
destroying life ; but at the time of committing the act he was not capable of
judging between right and wrong ;" and
a verdict was thereupon entered for the
defendant. 'Upon appeal, it was held
that this was correct, and that the mere
fact of the assured's inability to judge
between right and wrong was immaterial,
This case has sometimes been referred
to as authority for the proposition that
where a person takes his own life intentionally it is to be considered a voluntary
act and a death "by his own hand,"
within the meaning of the phrase as used
in policies of insurance, whether the act
is the direct result of insanity or not ;
but, as will be observed, it does not go
that far. See Clift v. Schwabe, 3 Com.
B. 437 ; White v. Ins. Co., 38 L. J.
Ch. (N. S.) 53.
In this country it has been followed in
New York: Van Zandt v. Ins. Co., 55
N. Y. 169; Fowler v. Ins. Co., 4 Lans.
202 ; Weed v. Life Ins. Co., 41 N. Y.
(Sup. Ct.) 476. See, also, dictum in
Hathaway v. Tns. Co., 48 Vt. 335.
And the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has gone beyond it, and holds that
where a policy provides that it shall be

void in case the assured shall "die by
suicide," and he takes his own life, knowing what the physical result of the act will
be, that the policy will be avoided, even
where the assured is impelled to the act
by insanity: Cooper v. Life Ins. Co.,
102 Mass. 227.
Rule in Terry's Case.-In a large
majority of the cases the courts of
this country have refused to follow Borradailev. Hunter, and hold that in order
to constitute death by the assured's hand
or act, the fatal act must be directed by
the sane will of a mind capable of distingaishing between right and wrong, a
knowledge of good and evil being considered as necessary to complete volition,
as knowledge of the physical character
of an act of self-destruction.
The leading case in favor of this view
is Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 1 Dill. 403 ;
s. c. 15 Wall. 580 (1872), which was
a suit upon a policy providing that " if
the said person whose life is hereby insured ** * shall die by his own hand
* * * this policy shall be null and void."
The case was tried in the Circuit Court
by a jury,. before Mr. Justice MUvern
and DxLLON, Circuit Judge. Evidence
was introduced tending to show that the
assured died from the effect of poison
taken while insane.
The defendant's
counsel requested the court to instruct the
jury. "Second. That if the jury believe
from the evidence that the self-destruction
of the said George Terry was intended
by him, he having sufficient capacity at.
the time to understand the nature of the
act which he was about to commit, and
the consequences which would result from
it, then, and in that case, it is wholly
immaterial in the present case that he
was impelled thereto by insanity, which
impaired his sense of moral responsibility,.and renderdd him, to a certain
extent, irresponsible for his actions."
The court refused to give the instruction, and charged, concerning the
degree of insanity necessary to withdraw
the act from the provision of the policy,
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as follows: "It is not every kind or
degree of insanity which will so far excuse the party taking his own life as to
make the company insuring liable. To
do this the act of self-destruction must
have been the consequence of the insanity, and the mind of the decedent must
have been so far deranged as to have
made him incapable of using a rational
judgment in regard to the act he was
committing. If he was impelled to the
act by an insane impulse, which the
reason that was left him did not enable
him to resist, or if his reasoning powers
were so far overthrown by his mental
condition that he could not exercise his
reasoning faculties on the act he was
about to do, the company is liable. On
the other hand, there is no presumption
of law, prima facie or otherwise, that
self-destruction arises from insanity, and
if you believe from the evidence that
the decedent, although excited or angry
or distressed in mind, formed the determnination to take his own life, because,
in the exercise of his usial reasoning
faculties, he preferred death to life, then
the company is not liable, because he
died by his.own hand within the meaning
of the policy."
The jury found for the plaintiff, and
there was judgment accordingly. The
defendant took the case to the Supreme
Court, where the judgment below was
affirmed. In delivering the opinion of
that court Air. Justice HUNT said : "We
hold the rule on the question before us to
be this: If the assured, being in the
possession of his ordinary reasoning
faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or
a desire to escape from the ills of life,
intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches, and therecan be no recovery if the death is caused by the
voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be
the result of his act ; but wheh his
reasoning faculties are so far impaired
that he is not able to understand the
moral character, the general nature, con-

sequences and effect of the act he is
about to commit, or when he is impelled
thereto by an insane impulse, which he
has not the power to resist, such death
is not within the contemplation of the
parties to the contract, and the insurer is
liable."
This rule has been criticised, both as
lacking in clearness and as being uncalled for by the facts of the case (Van
Zandt v. Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 269), but it
does not appear to the writer open
to either objection, and it has been approved and followed in later cases which
have came before the same tribunal:
Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232 ; Ins.
Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121.
The meaning of the rule in Terry's
case is made plainer, if possible, by
what was said by Mr. Justice GRAY in
Ins. Co. v. Broughton. In delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court in
that case, he said that an act of selfdestruction is not to be considered the
act of the assured when his "reason is
so clouded or disturbed by insanity as to
prevent his understanding the real nature
of the act as regards either its physical
consequences or moral aspect."
The rule in Terry's Case has been
adopted in Georgia: LNe Ass. of Am.
v. Waller, 57 Ga. 553. Tennessee:
Phadenhauer v. Ins. Co., 7 Heisk. 567.
Michigan: Ins. Co. v. .Moore, 34 Mich.
41. Ohio: Schultz v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio
St. 217, and Pennsylvania: Ins. Co. v.
Groom, 86 Penn. St. 92; Ins. Co. v. Iset's
Adm'r., 74 Id. 176.
PHRASES EM13RACING INSANE SELF-

DESTRUCTION.-" Die by his own hand
sane or insane:" Gogorza v. Ins. Co..
65 N. Y. 232. " Die by his own act or
intention, whether sane or insane:" Adkins
v. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27. "Die by
suicide, sane or nsane:" Bigelow v. Ins.
Co., 93 U. S. 284. "Die by suicide,
felonious or otherwise, sane or insane:"
Pierce v. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389 ; and die
by " self-destruction, felonious or otherwise:" Riley v. HartfordLife 6- Annu-
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ity Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 315; see also
dictum in Bigelow v. Ins. Co., 93 U. S,
284, 288, are synonymous expressions
and include all cases of voluntary selfdestruction, with an understanding of the
physical character of the act, whether the
act is the result of an insane condition
of the assured's mind or not.
Pxs sumipriozs.-Evidence.-Where
a person is found drowned without any
marks of violence on his person, that fact
is, of itself, no evidence of suicide: Ins.
Co. v. Ddpeuch, 82 Penn. St. 225 ;nor
is the fact that the deceased was a spiritualist and believed he would enjoy the
pleasures of this life in the next, admissible in evidence under such circumstances
to establish suicide: Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch,
supra.
The presumption-is ordinarily in favor
of a natural death: Hancock v. lns. Co.,
34 Mich. 42 ; Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 fI1.
35.
In Terry's Case, Mr. Justice MmaxR

instructed the jury, as we have seen, that
"there is no presumption of law, prima
facie or otherwise, that self-destruction
arises from insanity," and the rule, as
stated by him is supported by the cases :
Weed v. Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. (Sup. Ct.)
476; Phadenlzaurv. Ins. Co., 7 Heisk.
567 ; Coffey v. Ins. Co., 35 N. Y. (Sup.
Ct.) 314.
In Schultz v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 217,
itwas held that the presumption in case
of suicide, is that it was committed while
sane ; but the true rule is probably as
suggested in a New York case, that there
is no presumption either way : Coffey v.
Ins. Co.; 35 N. Y. (Sup. Ct.) 314. In
two cases it has been held that where
there is other evidence of insanity
the fficof suicide may be considered in
connection with that evidence : &hcefer
v. Ltfe Ins. Co., 25 Minn. 534 ; Weed
Ins. Co., 35 N. Y. (Sup. Ct.) 386.
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HAMMOND v. PEYTON, AssIGNEE.
As a general rule, the equitable lien of the grantor of real estate for the price
thereof is not assignable, although there may be exceptions to this rule in favor of
persons who merely stand as representatives of the grantor.
The lien itself is not in accordance with the policy of the law, and should be
restricted rather than fostered.
APPEAL

from an order of the District Court, Saint Louis county.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-The equitable. lien of a grantor for the price of real
estate has been recognised by this court in Selby v. Stanley, 4 Minn.
BERRY,

65, Gil. 34; -Doughadayv. Paine, 6 Minn. 443, Gil. 304; Duke
v. Balme, 16 Id. 306, Gil. 270; and Walter v. ffanson, 24 N. W.
Rep. 186.
But whether the lien is assignable, or whether, if assignable, it
passes upon the transfer of the debt which it secures as an incident
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thereof, and without any express or formal assignment, has not been
here determined. It is to be regretted that the idea of a grantor's
lien was ever admitted, especially in this country, where registration of transactions affecting real estate is so generally provided
for and practised. It is, however, recognised in England, and in a
majority of the states of the Union, though it is utterly repudiated
by several, and in others has been abolished by statute. See 3
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1249; Bisp. Eq. 353; Tiedm. Real Prop. 292, and
notes.
In Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Yes. 329, the leading case, Lord
ELDON appears to look upon the doctrine of lien vith disfavor;
and see in the same direction, KYettlewell v. Watson, 21 Oh. Div.
702; and, in this country, we find still more emphatic protests
against it, and regrets that it should have ever been allowed to gain
a footing: Bayley v. Greenleaf,7 Wheat. 46. MARSHALL, 0. J.;
Briggs v. Hill, 6 How. (Miss.) 362; 3 Por. Eq. Jur. 256, note
1; Simpson v. Afundee, 3 Kan. 172; Pkilbrook v. -Delano, 29
Me. 410; SHEPLEY, 0. J. ; Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261,
GRAY, 0. J. ; Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 S. & R. 64, GIBSON, J. ; Telborn v. Bonner, 9 Ga. 82, Perhaps one of the strongest indorsements of the doctfine is found in Xanly v. Slason, 21 Vermont
271, by REDFIELD, C. J., in 1849; but in 1851 it was utterly
wiped out by the legislature of that state. "As to its origin and
rationale," says Mr. Pomeroy, 3 Eq. Jur. 1252, citing many
authorities, "there has been a great diversity of opinion.- It has
been accounted for as a trust, as an equitable mortgage, as arising
from a natural equity, and as a contrivance of the chancellors to
evade the unjust rule of the early common law by which land was
free from the claims of simple contract creditors." And this author,
rejecting all these theories himself, accounts for it as an instance of
the "higher importance, consideration and value given to real than
to personal property." And in sect. 1251 of the same work it is
well said, that "no other single topic belonging to equity jurisprudence has occasioned such a diversity, and even discord, of
opinion among the American courts as this of the grantor's lien.
Upon nearly every question that has arisen as to its operation, its
waiver or discharge, the parties against whom it avails, and the
parties in whose favor it exists, the decisions in different states, and
sometimes even in the same state, are directly conflicting. It is
practically impossible to formulate any general rule representing
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the doctrine as established throughout the whole country." See
cases cited. See also, 1 Perry Trusts 234.
We have referred to these matters for the purpose of showing the
standing of the doctrine of a grantor's lien, and the disposition and
tendency of the courts and of legislation towards it, and contenting
ourselves with a reference to the authorities already cited, without
here entering into a detailed presentation of them, we feel warranted in saying, that this disposition and tendency is at least not
to extend the doctrine beyond what may be regarded as the comparatively well settled and established rules of equity in reference
to liens of this kind. In other words, the doctrine is not one to be
fostered and encouraged, or allowed to spread, but rather to be kept
strictly within limits; and this upon the grounds that it is unnecessary for the protection of a grantor, who may readily, cheaply, and
conveniently secure himself by a mortgage which can be put upon
record; that the lien is in the nature of i secret and invisible trust,
and therefore opposed to the policy and spirit of our registration
system'; that a sale subject to it is calculated to give a false appearance of credit, and that it is contrary to the spirit and policy of our
laws, which favor the free transmission of real estate under such
conditions that a purchaser may, with reasonable certainty, know
what is the precise state of the title which he acquires, and without
being subject to the doubt and uncertainty which will be occasioned
by such questions as whether there was a grantor's lien, or whether,
if there was one, it has been waived or discharged, and whether it
has been assigned or not, or whether, if assigned, it still continues;
all questions dehor8 any record.
The application of the foregoing considerations, which we propose to make in this case, will appear hereafter. We have been
unable to find any adjudication in the English courts (where the
doctrine of vendors' lien originated), squarely to the effect that a
grantor's lien is assignable. The case of Dryden v. Prost, 3 Mylne
& 0. 670, cited by counsel and by many text-writers, does not, in
our judgment, go to that extent. While there is in this country a
diversity of opinion, in most of the states the lien is held to be personal to the grantor and not assignable, and it would, of course,
follow that in those states the transfer of. the debt,*either with or
without an assignment of the lien, would not pass the lien to
the transferee. This result of the authorities in this country may
be verified by reference to the cases cited in 3 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
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§ 1254, note; and see also, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed. 492;
Tiedm. Real Prop., § 294 ; 2 Sugd. Vend. 398, note by Perkins;
Bisp. Eq., § 356 ; -Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410 ; Ahrend v.
Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261 ; Simpson v. Jundee, 3 Kan. 172; Baum
v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 173; Welborn v. Bonner, 9 Ga. 82; Briggs
v. Hill, 6 How. (Miss.) 362; 1 Jones Mort., § 212. In this conflict of authority as to the assignability of grantor's liens, we propose, in accordance with the consideration before mentioned, to
adopt for this state the rule which is certainly sanctioned by a great,
and we think a preponderant, weight of authority, and which commends itself to our judgment as most wholesome, best calculated to
promote the general interest, and most in accordance with the spirit
and policy of our laws ; and this is in the direction of restricting
rather than extending the scope of the lien. We therefore hold
that a grantor's lien is not generally assignable. We are not, however, to be understood as holding that it may not descend to the
grantor's representative, nor that it may not pass to his assignee
for the benefit of the creditors, nor that there may not be some other
case in which it may pass to some person who may be regarded as
merely representing the grantor and his interest, and not as acting
simply for himself.
It may be suggested that the conclusion which we have reached
is inconsistent with analogies of the law; but to this it may well be
answered that this lien is a mere creature of equity, and therefore
entitled to be recognised only as equity has created it and as it is.
Aside from this, the considerations before presented distinguish it
from such liens as, instead of being disfavored, are favored in law ;
as, for instance, mechanics' liens. These being created by statute,
without restrictions as to assignability, must be regarded as favored
in law, and therefore entitled to beneficial construction. This disposes of the case; but we may add, that if there were any doubt
about the correctness of our conclusion, it is by no means clear that
the acts of plaintiff, claimed to amount to a waiver, would not lead
to the same result.
Order sustaining the demurrer affirmed.
The question of the assignability of a
vendor's or grantor's lien is in inextrieable confusion in this country. The
distinction between a vendor's lien and
a grantor's lien has been lost sight of or
abandoned. The grantor's lien is
VoL. XXXIV.-5O

equitable, exists only in equity jurispradence, and is of purely equitable cognisance. The entire legal estate and the
actual possession vests in the grantor.
Thus there are two classes of cases: 1.
Where there is an absolute deed given
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which conveys away the legal title.
2. Where only a bond for a deed is
given to convey when the purchasemoney is paid. The vendor who retains
his legal title and merely gives his bond
to convey is in a very different condition
in regard to the land he has sold than he
who has made an absolute deed conveying away the legal title. When the
legal title is retained, the transaction on
its face shows that it is the intention to
hold such title as security. It is equivalent to conveying the land and taking a
reconveyance by way of mortgage. In
such a case the question of want of notice cannot arise, for he who purchases
from one whose only title is a bond to
convey, must know the rights of the
original holder or be guilty of such
negligence as is evidence of fraud. It
will be seen that the doctrine of the
cases which bold that the assignee
of a note given for the purchasemoney of land does not acquire the lien
which the vendor himself had, can
have no application to cases where the
legal title does not pass.
The vendor's lien is held to be nonassignable in Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,.
New York, Ohio and Tennessee. Where
an express assignment is thus forbidden,
it follows that an equitable assignment
by way of subrogation is impossible.
Where by express arrangement the purchase-money note is given to a third person, instead of the grantor, such person
is generally held entitled to the lien :
Mitchell v. Butt, 45 Ga. 162 ; Nichols
v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24 ; Hamilton v. Gilbert, 2 Heisk. 680 ; Francis v. Wldls, 2
Col. 660; Perkins v. Gibson, 51 Miss.
699; Lathan v. Staples, 46 Ala. 462;
Campbell v. Roach, Id. 667.
In a note to the leading case of Mackreth v. Symmons, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq.
494, it is said: "It seems to be
settled that if a debt is secured by an
express lien, as where there is an agree-

ment for a lien which creates an equitable
mortgage, or where the vendor has not
parted with the legal tide, an assignment
of the debt entitles the assignee to the
benefit of the pledge: Graham v. McCampbell, Meigs 52; Eskridge T. McClure, 2 Yerg. 84; Tanner v. Hicks,
4 S. & M. 294.
In some states it appears to be settled that there is no distinction between an express and implied
lien as to transferability, and that an
assignment of the note or bond for the
purchase-money carries the lien : Kenny
v. Collins, 4 Little 289 ; Johnston v.
Gwathmey, Id. 317 ; Eubank v. Poster, 5
Mon. 285; Edwards v. Bohannan, 2
Dana 95; Honore v. Bakewell, 6 33.
Mon. 67; Ripperdon v. Cozine, 8 Id.
465.; Ftsher v. Johnson, 5 Ind. 492.
Arkansas: The existence of the vendor's lien was recognised in Schall v.
Biscoe, 18 Ark. 142; Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Id. 192. The vendor's lien
cannot be transferred by .assignment or
by subrogation: Schall v. Biscoe, 18
Ark. 142 ; Hutton v. Moore, 26 Id. 382.
The law from the time the memoy of
man runneth not to the contrary has
been that the vendor's lien was personal
and not assignable : Jones vY Dos, 2 Ark.
519 ; not assignable unless under some
peculiar circumstances:
Crawley v.
Riggs, 24 Ark. 563; Carlton v. Buckner, 28 Id. 66 ; Mfoore v. Andres, 14 Id.
634; Blevin v. Rogers, 32 Id. 258; may
be enforced by the heirs of the vendor:
Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Id. 192.
Georgia: In Wellborn v. Williams, 9
Ga. 86, NIsBET, 3., after a careful examination of many of the authorities,
held that the mere assignment of the
purchase-money note did not carry the
lien. "The vendor's is.a secret, invisible,
unregistered lien. We are wholly disindined to extend it to the assignee of the
notes ;" followed in Webb v. Robinson,
14 Ga. 216. Lien abolished by statute:
Code of Ga. 1873, see. 1997.
Maryland: Vendor's lien recognised
in Magruderv. Peter, 11 Gill& J.217;
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Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 285, Held not
assignable: Dixon v. Dixon, 1 Md. Ch.
220 ; Inglehart v. Arminger, 1 Bland's
Ch. 519; Moreton v. Harrison, Id.
491. In Schnebly v. Ragan, 7 Gill &
J. 124, the court inclined to the belief
that the assignee might get the benefit
of the lien by express agreement, but
held that where the vendor assigned the
purchase-money note "without
recourse," the lien, being personal, was
extinguished.
Missouri: Lien recognised in M5arsh
v. Turner, 4 Mo. 553 ; Delassus v.
Poston, 19 Id. 425 ; not assignable:
Pearl v. Heervey, 70 Mo. 160; except
where the vendor retains the legal title
Adams v. Cowherd, 30 Id. 459.
Ohio : Lien recognised in Williams v.
Roberts, 5 Ohio 35; Anketel v. Converse, 17 Ohio St. 11; held not assignable in Brush v. Kinsley, 14 Ohio 20 ;
Horton v. Horner, Id. 437 ; Jack-man v.
Hallock, I Id. 318.
Tennessee : Lien recognised in Eskridge v. MeClure, 2 Yerg. 84 ; Ross v.
Whltson, 6 Id. 50; not assignable :
Durant v. Davis, 10 Heisk. 522; Tharpe
v. Dunlap, 4 Id. 674; transfer of the
purchase-money note extinguishes the
lien: Gann v. Chester, 5 Yerg. 205.
See Claiborne v. Crockett, 3 Id. 27 ;
Graham v. McCampbell, Meigs 52;
Green v. Demoss, 10 Humph. 371.
Iowa: The assignee of a note given
for the purchase-money of land cannot
in equity enforce the original lien of the
vendor against the land: Dickenson v.
Chase, I Morris 492; Crow v. Vane, 4
Iowa 436.
Lien recognised in Grapengether v. Feervary, 9 Iowa 163;
Johnson v. McCrew, 43 Id. 555.
Must
be reserved by way of mortgage or
other duly executed instrument: Rev.
Stat. 1873, see. 1940.
Illinois : Vendor's lien recognised in
DP- v. Martin, 4 Scam. 148 ; Keith v.
HIorner, 42 Ill.
524 ; Kirkham v. Boston, 67 Id. 599 ; Moshier v. Meek, 80
Id. 79 ; but is personal and cannot be
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assigned: Small v. Stogg, 95 I. 39;
Wing v. Goodman, 75 Id. 159 ; 3foshzer
v. Meek, 80 Id. 79; Carpenter v.
Mitchell, 54 Id. 126 ; Richards v. Learning, 29 Id. 431. Will pass to personal
representative, but cannot he made the
subject of sale or transfer by contract:
Keith v. Horner, 32 Ill. 534; McLaurie
v. Thomas, 39 Id. 291; Dayhuff v.
Dayhuff, 81 Id. 499.
Assignment of
the note destroys the lien: Moshier v.
Meek, 80 Ill. 79. Lien is not assignable
even by express language: Markoe v.
Andreas, 67 Ill. 34 ; but it may be made
assignable by an express reservation in
the deed, which when recorded is in
effect a mortgage: Carpenterv. Mitchell,
54 111. 126.
California: Lien recognised in Salmon v. floff'man, 2 Cal. 138 ; Gallagher
v. Mars, 50 Id. 23.
In Baum v.
Grigsby, 21 Cal. 173, FzELD, J., said :
" The cases which deny that the lien
passes with the personal security of the
vendee do not vest, except in a few instances, upon the want of a special assignment from the vendor, but upon the
ground that the lien is in its nature unassignable.
There is a marked distinction between the lien of a vendor,
after absolute conveyance, and the lien
of a vendor where the contract of sale is
unexecuted. In the latter case the vendor holds the legal estate as security for
the purchase-money; he can assign his
contract with the conveyance of the
title, and in such case the assignee will
acquire the same rights and be subject to
the same liabilities as himself: Sparks
v. Hess, 15 Cal. 194 ; Taylor v. MeKinney, 20 Id. 618. In the former case
the vendor retains a mere equity, which
to become of any force or effect must be
established by the decree of the court :
Lewis v. Corilland,21 Cal. 179 ; Wllliams v. Young, Id. 227 ; Porter v.
Brooks, n5 Id. 199 ; Ross v. Heintzen,
36 Id. 313.
New York: Lien recognised in Warner v. Alstyne, 3 Paige 513; Chase v.
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Peck, 21 N. Y. 581 ; Stafford v. Van
Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316; Gzarson v.
Green, 1 Johns. Ch. 308; Smith v.
Smith, 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 420. In White
v. Williams, 1 Paige 502, Chancellor
WALWORTH held that the vendor's lien
did not pass by implication to the assignee
of the note, but intimated that it might
oe transferred by special agreement. 'See
Smith v. Smith, 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 420.
In Hallork v. Smith, 3 Barb. 272,
STRONG, J., said: "If the note or
bond is assigned or transferred to a third
person for his benefit, the security is
gone forever. The reason is, there is no
peculiar equity in favor of third parsons.
But that does not apply where, as in
this case, the transfer is only for the
purpose of paying the debt of the vendor, so far as it ma' be available, and
is therefore for his benefit; there the
equity continues."
Mississippi: The existence of lien
recognised in Dodge v. Evans, 43 Miss.
570; Davidson v. Allen, 36 Id. 419.
Lien personal and not assignable:
Briggs v. Hill, 6 How. 362 ; Lindsey v.
Bates, 42 Miss. 396; Walker v. Williams, I Geo. 165; Harvey v. Kelly, 41
Miss. 490; Skaggs v. Nelson, 3 Cush.
88; Pitts v. Parker,. 44 Miss. 247.
Rutland v. Brister, 53 Id. 683. Lieu is
destroyed by assignment of the purchasemoney note: Pitts v. Parker, supra.
But in case the vendor is compelled to
take up the note the lien revives: Lindsey v. Bates, 42 Miss. 397; Stratton v.
Gold, 40 Id. 778; see Perkins v. Gibson, 51 Id. 699; Cotton v. McGehee, 54
Id. 510. The vendor's lien is not lost
by assignment, where title bond only is
given. The effect of the title bond, so
far as it effects the securing of the purchase-money, is a conveyance of the
title and the taking of a mortgage : Tanner v. Hicks, 4 S. & M. 294 ; citing
Dollahite v. 0me, 27Id. 590; Parkerv.
Kelly, 10 Id. 184; Wilkins v. Humphrey, 1 Cush. 311; Robinson v. Barbsur, 42 Miss. 795; Pitts v. Parker,

44 Id. 247; Mt ,re v. Lackey, 53 Id.
* 85; Mhoon v. Wilkerson, 47 Id. 633.
Alabama: Lien recognised: Gordon
v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213; Wood v. Sullens,
44 Id. 686. The transfer of the debt
carries the lien: Simpson v. McAllister,
56 Ala. 228; Wells v. Morrow, 38 Id.
125; White v. Stover, 10 Id. 441 ;
Grigsby v. Hair,25 Id. 327 ; Roper v.
McCook, 7 Id. 319 ; Plowman v. Riddle,
14 Id. 169. But if the purchase-money
note be assigned "without recourse," or
in any other manner which cuts off the
vendor's liability, the lien is held not to
pass: Hall v. Click, 5 Ala. 363;
Grigsby v. Hair, 25 Id. 327; Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Id. 457 ; Barnett v.
Riser's, Ex. 63 Id. 347 ; Walker v. Carroll, 65 Id. 61. Where the lien passes
by assignment and the note is returned
to the vendor unpaid, he may enforce the
lien: White v. Stover, 10 Ala. 441
Roper v. McCook, 7 Id. 318; Hall's
Exr's. v. Click, 5 Id. 363; Kellyv.
Payne, 18 Id. 373.
Indiana : Lien recognised in Diebler
v. Barnwick, 4 Blackf. 339 ; Yargan v.
&Shriver,26 Ind. 364. A transfer of the
debt carrieh the lien: Nichols v. Glover,
41 Ind. 24; Johns v. Sewell, 33 Id. I ;
Wiseman v. Hutchinson, 21 Id. 40;
Kern v. Hazlerigg, 11 Id. 443.
Kentucky : Lien recognised in Thornton v. Knox, 6 B. Mon. 74 ; Tiernan v.
Thurman, 14 Id. 277. Maybe assigned:
Broadwell v. King, 3 B. Mon. 449 ;
Honore's Ezr's v. Bakewell, 6 Id. 67';
Ripperdon v. Cozine, 8 Id. 465; Enbank v. Paston, Id..286; Edwards v.
Bahannon, 3 Dana 98; Johnston v,
Gwathmey, 4 Little 317; Kinny v. Collins, Id. 289; Thoms v. Wyatt, 5
Moore 132.
Texas: Lien recognised in Briscoe v.
Bronaugh, 1 Tex..326; Yarborough v.
Wood, 42 Id. 91.
Held assignable in
Debruhl v. Maas, 54 Tex. 464.; White
v. Downs, 40 Id. 225; Watt v. White,
30 Id. 421.
Lien recoo ii.. in
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v. Van Renselaer, Harr. 225; Payne v.
Avery, 21 Mich. 524. New Jersey: In
Van Dore v. Todd, 2 Green 397 ; CorWislus v. Howland, 26 N. J. 311.
consin: In Tiebey v. MfcAlister, 9 Wis.
463; flard v. Reas, 26 Id. 540.
Colorado: In Francis v. Wells, 2 Col.
660. Florida: In Bradford v. 3artin,
2 Fla. 463. District of Columbia: In
Ford v. Smith, I McArthur 592. OreAon : In Pease v. Kelly, 3 Oreg.
417.
Vendor's lien denied and repudiated
in Kansas: Simpson v. unidee, 3 Kans.
172; Smith v. Rowland, 13 Id. 246.
South Carolina: lfuragq v. Compt. Gen.,
2 Dessaus. 509. North Carolina: Womble T. Battle, 3 Ired. EAq.182 ; Cameron
v. Mason, 7 Id. 180. Maine: Gilnan
v. Brown, I Mason 192; Philbrook v.
Delano, 29 Me. 410. Massachusetts:
Wright v. Dane: 5 Met. 485 ; Ahrens v.

Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261. Pennsylvania:
Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 S. & 11. 64; Zentrnyer v. Alittower, 5 Penn. St. 403 ; Stephens's Appeal, 38 Id. 9.
Left in doubt in Connecticut : Atwaod
v.
hincent, 17 Conu. 575 ; 1Vatson v.
lWells, 5 Id. 468 ; Chapman v. Beardsley,
31 Id. 115. New Hampshire: Arlien v.
Brown, 44 N. H. 102. lhode Island :
Perry v. Grunt, 10 R. I. 334. In Vermont Virginia and West Virginia, upheld by judicial decisions, but now
abolished by statute. In West Virginia
and Virginia it may be reserved on the
face of the deed. See Vermont Statutes
of 1851, Ch. 47 ; Manly v. Slason, 21
Virginia: Code 1873, Ch.
Vt. 271.
115, see. I ; Vade v. Greenwood,2 Robt.
475. West Virginia: Code 1870, Ch.
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Su&reme Court of Blinod.
KELLEY v. PEOPLE.
An act providingincreased penalties forsecond and subsequent offences of burglary,
grand larceny, horse-stealing, robbery, forgery, or counterfeiting, is not unconstitutional, either as visiting penalties disproportioned to the offences, or as placing the
defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offence.
'here such act provides that, whenever any person having been convicted of either
of several enumerated crimes shall thereafter be convicted of any one of such crimes,
he shall be liable to such increased penalty it does not require that the second offence dealt with therein shall be a second instance of the identical crime for which
the offender was first convicted. Therefore, a conviction of burglary, accompanied
y proof of a former conviction of robbery, constitutes a case of second offence.
The fact that the former conviction, which is proved in order to constitute a second
offence, was erroneous, will not prevent the operation of the statute, if such error did
not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
Conceding that a trial by the court of a criminal case, the defendant having waived
a jury, is erroneous, yet such an error will not make the conviction void ; and such
a conviction of one of the offences enumerated in the above-cited act will render a
subsequent conviction of any of those.offences a second conviction within the meaning
of the act.
The fact that the constitution of the state has been disregarded in the course of
judicial proceedings will not render the judgtnent in which such proceedings terminate
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void, if the error was not upon a jurisdictional point; nor can such judgment be collaterally impeached. The trial by the court of a man upon a criminal charge, he
having waived a jury, while an error, is not a jurisdictional error.

ERoit to Criminal Court, Cok county.

J. X. Longnecker, for plaintiff in error.
J. S. Grinnell, Prosecuting Atty., and Geo. Hunt, Atty.-Gen.,
for the People.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-Joseph Kelley, at the January term, 1884, was
tried by a jury in the Criminal Court of Cook county for burglary;
the indictment containing a count setting forth a former conviction,
at the July term 1882, of said Kelley for robbery. He was found
guilty of burglary, and the jury, under the instruction of the court,
fixed his punishment at fourteen years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. The court sentenced him accordingly.
Several questions are raised with respect to the act respecting
convictions upon second and third offences, approved .June 23,
1888. Laws l8 8 3 ,p. 76. That act, in its first section, is as follows:
"That whenever any person, having been convicted of either of
the crimes of burglary, grand larceny, horse-stealing, robbery, forgery or counterfeiting, shall thereafter -be convicted of any one of
such crimes committed after such first conviction, the punishment
shall be imprisonment in the penitentiary for the full term provided
by law for such crime at the time of such last conviction therefor;
and, whenever any such person having been so convicted the second
time, as above provided, shall be again convicted of any of said
crimes committed after said second conviction, the punishment shall
be imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of not less than
fifteen years ; provided, that such former conviction or convictions
and judgment or judgments shall be set forth in apt words in the
indictment."
It is objected that the act is unconstitutional in .that it violates
the provision "that all penalties shall be proportional to the nature
of the offence ;" and it is because of a former conviction, for which
the person *charged has paid the penalty. Similar statutes have
been adopted in many of the states, and they are upon the principle
that it is just that an old offender should be punished more severely
for a second offence; that repetition of the offence aggravates guilt:
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1 Bish. Crim. Law 959; 1 Whart. Crimes, § 13. It would be entirely competent for the legislature, in the absence of this act, to
affix, as a punishment for the first commission of any one of the
crimes named, the highest punishment that is authorized by the act,
and it would not be for the court to say the penalty was not proportioned to the nature of the offence.
It is urged that under this act it is putting the accused in jeopardy twice for the same offence, in violation of sect. 10, art. 2, of the
constitution. There is no trial twice for the same offence, but twice
for two crimes committed at different times. The constitutional
objections are without force.
It is next insisted, that under this act, the second conviction
must be for the same crime the former conviction was for. We do
not so read the statute. The language is most plain : that, whenever any person, having been convicted of either of the several
enumerated crimes, shall thereafter be convicted of any one of such
crimes, etc. It seems quite clear that the second conviction is not
to be of a particularone of the crimes-the one for which the former conviction was had-but of any one of the crimes named.
The record introduced to show a former conviction for robbery
shows that the accused was indicted for robbery at the July term
of court, 1882, and that he pleaded not guilty; that he waived the
intervention of a jury, and was tried by the court without a jury,
and found guilty by the court in manner and form as charged in the
indictment-that is to say, of robbery-and was sentenced to the
penitentiary for one year.
It is insisted that this did not show a legal conviction of robbery:
that the accused in a criminal case of felony cannot waive a trial
by jury and be tried, by consent, by the court, and upon a finding
of guilty on such a trial be legally sentenced thereon. Conceding
this to be so, and that a judgment upon such a finding would be
irregular and erroneous, it does not follow that such conviction was
void-an absolute nullity-and not to be taken here as a former
conviction. There is a distinction between "void" and " erroneous ;" and the general rule is undoubted, that where the court
has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person, its judgment in the case will not be void, although it may be erroneous, and
that in a collateral proceeding the validity of the judgment cannot
be called in question.
In the application of the rule to the precise kind of case which
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is here presented, what of authority we have met with is not entirely
harmonious. Thus in Windsor v. Mc Veigh, 93 U. S. 274, in the
opinion by a divided court, by iWay of illustration of the argument
that a judgment may be void notwithstanding general jurisdiction
of the subject, in citation of instances it is said : " So a departure
from established rules of procedure will often render the judgment
void; thus the sentence oik a'person charged with felony, upon conviction by the court without the intervention of a jury, would be
invalid for any purpose ;" no authority being cited. In Cor. v.
-Dailey, 12 Cush. 84, in substance a verdict of guilty rendered in a
case of misdemeanor, where the defendant had consented to a trial by
eleven jurors, which is-as nuch a ground of exception, it was said:
"As it did not affect the jurisdiction of the court, the exception was
one that the accused might waive." So in the recent case of Lowery v. Howard (decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana), 3 N. E.
Rep. 124, wherd, upon a plea of guilty to an indictment for murder, the court fixed the punishment at imprisonment in the state's
prison for life, and so sentenced the prisoner, when, under the.law,
a jury should have assessed the punishment to suffer the penalty of
death, or be imprisoned in the state's prison for life, it was held that
the judgment of the court was erroneous, but not void. And in
Ex Tarte Bond, 9 S. 0. 80, where a prisoner was convicted of an
assault with intent to kill, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary, when the offence was not punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary, it was held that the sentence was not void, but only
erroneous. In Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, Chief Justice MARSHALL said: "An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful unless that judgment be an absolute nullity, and it is not a
nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although
it should be erroneous."
In Windsor v. Mo JTeigh, supra,it was said the general doctrine
upon this subject is only correct when the court proceeded after
acquiring jurisdiction of the cause according to the established mode
governing the class to which the case belongs, and did not transcend, in the extent or character of its judgment, the law which is
ipplicable to it. It was further said, that the more correct statement of the doctrine was in Cornett v. William, 20 Wall. 250:
that "the jurisdiction having attached in the case, everything done
within the power of that jurisdiction,when collaterally questioned,
is held conclusive of the right of the parties unless impeached by
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fraud.'" The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction.
It is coram judice whenever a cause is presented which brings this
power into action: U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 709; Bush v. Kanson, 70 Ill. 482.
In the case here (of the former conviction) there was unbounded
jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and person. The court had
power to proceed to hear and determine. The judgment was not
such an one as the court had no power, under any circumstances,.
i. e., upon any state of facts, to pronounce in such a case ; but it
was one within the power of the jurisdiction which had attached.
See P-eople v. Liseomb, 60 N. Y. 570. If there had been a finding
of guilty, and a punishment by a jury, or if there had been a plea
of guilty by the prisoner, in either such case the judgment would
have been right. If the judgment be wrong, it is because it was
rendered upon the court's finding the guilt and fixing the punishment; so that the correctness of the judgment depended upon the
particular state of facts which was presented in the progress of the
hearing and determination of a case of which the court had jurisdiction. The error was one in the exercise of jurisdiction, and not from
want of jurisdiction.
The only suggestion of ground there can be for holding the judgment void, and not erroneous merely, is that there was a departure
from the established mode of procedure. To admit such ground of
holding a judgment void, would, as iDseems to us, in a great measure break down and make uncertain the well-established distinction
in regard to the validity of a judgment when collaterally questioned
between being void for want of jurisdiction, or erroneous merely in
the exercise of jurisdiction.
In Cooley's Oonst. Lim. (5th ed.) 504, 505, it is laid down: "It
is a general rule that irregularities in the course of judicial proceedings do not render them void. An irregularity may be defined as a
failure to observe that particular course of procedure which conformably with the practice of the court, ought to have been observed in the
case." And on page 507: "In any case, we suppose a failure
to award a jury on proper demand would be an irregularity merely
rendering the proceedings liable to reversal, but not making them
void."
We are of opinion the former conviction here should be adjudged
to be no more than erroneous, and not to be an absolute nullity;
and especially so, under the circumstances of this case, where the
VOL. XXXIV.-51
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defendant accepted the sentence of the court and suffered it to be
carried into execution by undergoing the punishment. The court
had fixed the minimum punishment for robbery-one year in the
penitentiary; the maximum being-fourteen years. The defendant
may have deemed it for his interest to abide by the sentence of the
court rather than to have it set aside, and he be exposed to the peril
of having a greater punishment affixed by a jury. The judgment
having been acquiesced in, and full execution had of it, we do not
see how it can be looked upon as a nullity. It must be held to be,
for the defendant, an acquittance from the crime. Upon another
indictment for the same offence, he might plead the former conviction in bar; and if, in favor of the prisoner, the former conviction
would not be held a nullity, neither, as against him, should it be so
held.

Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
The rule laid down in the principal
case respecting waiver of trial by jury in
a case of felony is of such importance as
to deserve more than a passing notice.
We have always supposed that the jury
constituted an integral part of the tribunal established by the constitution for
the trial of persons indicted for, felony.
With respect to this question Judge
CooLEY says, in his work upon Constitutional Limitations: "A petit, petty, or
traverse jury is a body of twelve men,
who are sworn to try the facts of a case
as they are presented in the evidence
placed before them. Any less than this
number of twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as the
constitution guarantees to accused parties
when a less number is not allowed in
express terms; and the necessity of a
full panel could not be waived-at least
in case of felony-even by consent."
Cooley's Const. Lim. *319 ; Work v.
State, 2 Ohio St. 296 ; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Brown v. State, 8
Blatchf. 561 ; Hill v. People, 16 Mich.
351 ; State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 ;
Brown v. State, 16 Ind. 496 ; Opinions
of .Tudges, 41 N. H. 550; Vaughn v.
Sade, 30 Mo..600; Kleinschlnidt v.
Dunphy, I Montana 118 ; Allen v. &ate,

54 Ind. 461 ; &ate v. Lockwood, 43 Wis.
403 ; State v. -Davis, 66 Mo. 684 ;
Williams v. State, 12. Ohio St. 622;
Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich. 443; Bell v.
State, 44 Ala. 393; Statev. Carman, 63
Iowa 130; State v. Langan, 23 N. W.
Rep. 907. See contra, State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578.
We have examined all the cases above
cited ; and while in none of them does
the question of the validity of the sentence
upon a trial by the court, or by the courts
with less than a common-law jury, come
in question in a collateral proceeding, in
the most of them it seems taken forgranted
that such a sentence is a nullity. The
words "nullity," "null and void," are
frequently used by the courts and writere
to express the effect of such a sentence.
We are aware of but one case, and that
a nisi prius one, where the precise question has arisen; and that arose upon
habeas corpus before the. Hon. WILLIAM
W. McAIsTER, of the Appellate Court
for this district ; who held that the sentence of a prisoner tried by the court
without a jury, upon an indictment for a
felony, trial by jury having been waived
by the defendant, was a nullity ; and who
upon the trial court's declining to again
take cognisance of the case and retry the

KELLEY v. PEOPLE.
prisoner, ordered his discharge. The
opinion of this learnea jurist, though not
rendered by a court of last resort, is justly
entitled to great weight. It was his
opinion in this case that the jury was an
integral part of the court, and that it was
not competent for the parties by consent
to change the constitution of the court.
People v. Hanchett, 15 Chic. Leg. News
320 ; (but see People v. Lyons, reported
same book and page.)
Such also, apears to be the opinion of
Mr. Justice CooLEy, whose opinion upon
such a subject is also entitled to great respect. We do not regard the quotation
made by the Court in the principal case
from Cooley's Const. Lim., that in any
case a failure to award a jury on proper
demurrer would be an irregularity merely
rendering the proceedings liable to removal, but not making them void, and
for which he cites no authority, as expressing his opinion upon the precise
point in question; for in another place
where he is considering *the subject of
waiver of a jury in cases of felony he
says: "The infirmity in case of a trial
by a jury of less than twelve, by consent,
would be that the tribunal would be one
unknown to the law, created by the mere
voluntary act of the parties; and it
would in effect be an attempt to submit
to a species of arbitration the question
whether the accused has been guilty of
an offence against the state :11 Cooley
Const. Lim. *319.
Granting the premise of the court in
the principal case that the trial of a case
of felony by the court without a jury is
merely " a departure from the established
mode of procedure," we can agree with
their conclusions that it is error only ;
but it seems to us that it is more than a
mere departure from the established mode
of procedure. As the court say in Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 282, "the
doctrine invoked by counsel that where
a court has once acquired jurisdiction, it
has a right to decide every question
which arises in the case, and its judg-
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ment, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is undoubtedly correct
as a general proposition ; but like all
general propositions is subject to many
qualifications in its application. All
courts, even the highest, are more or less
limited in their jurisdiction; they are
limited to particular classes of actions,
such as civil or criminal; or to particular modes of administering relief, such
as legal or equitable ; or to transactions
of a special character, such as arise in
navigable rivers, or relate to testamentary
disposition of real estate ; or to the case
of particular process in the enforcement of
the judgments. Norton v. Meador, Circuit
Court for California. Though the court
may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of
the subject-matter and of the parties,
it is still limited in its modes of
proccdure, and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act
judicially in all things, and cannot then
transcend the power conferred by the law.
If, for instance, the action be upon a
money demand, the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the subject and the parties, has no power to pass
judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant. If the
action be for a libel or personal tort, the
court cannot order in the case a specific
performance of a contract. If the action
be for the possession of real property,
the court is powerless to admit in the
case the probate of a will. * * * The
judgments mentioned, given in the cases
supposed, would not be merely erroneous,
they would be absolutely void ; because
the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of its authority in those
cases. * * * So a departure from established modes of procedure will often make
the judgment void ; thus, the sentence
of a person charged with felony upon
conviction by the court without the intervention of a jury, would be invalid for
any purpose. The decree of a court of
equity upon oral allegations without written pleadings, would be an idle act, of no

